Thursday, June 28, 2012

Woman sues N.J. Little Leaguer for errant throw

While the AP story (on the USA Today website) doesn't say whether Elizabeth Lloyd was at a New Jersey park in May 2010 to watch a Manchester Township Little League game, Nicholas Huba's story in the Asbury Park Press says that Lloyd, who recently sued young Matthew Migliaccio, was there to watch her son play.

Ms. Lloyd was apparently seated at picnic table adjacent to a fenced-in bullpen area where 11-year old Migliaccio was warming up a pitcher. That's young Mr. Migliaccio in the accompanying photo, sitting on the bench where he says Ms. Lloyd was sitting when he uncorked a wild throw. Instead of hitting the pitcher's glove, Migliaccio's ball sailed 10 feet over the other kid's head, hitting Ms. Lloyd in the face.

Huba writes that the table was five feet away from the bullpen, down the third base line; the caption to the photograph (which is taken from Huba's article) puts the bullpen behind Migliaccio in the photograph. (None of the articles I reviewed address the height of the fence separating the bullpen and the spectator area at the time of the incident. It would be interesting to know, for example, whether that ad sign was in place when all this happened.)

In an article posted June 26, the Newark Star-Ledger quotes Migliaccio in an interview with Good Morning America as saying, "I went over to see if she was okay, and she said that she was fine and not to worry about it." But Huba's account for APP.com says Lloyd "was taken to a hospital emergency room after the May 2010 incident – [she] had to undergo reconstructive surgery and suffers from headaches." Lloyd is alleging "multiple fractures," Huba writes.

And Lloyd is alleging that Migliaccio hit her intentionally, according to Huba. Huba quotes Riaz A. Mian, Lloyd's attorney, as charging Migliaccio threw "his best fast ball over the bullpen into the picnic area, striking my client in the face."

According to the linked AP account:
The lawsuit filed April 24 alleges Migliaccio's errant throw was intentional and reckless, "assaulted and battered" Lloyd and caused "severe, painful and permanent" injuries.

A second count alleges Migliaccio's actions were negligent and careless through "engaging in inappropriate physical and/or sporting activity" near Lloyd. She continues to suffer pain and anguish, incur medical expenses and has been unable to carry out her usual duties and activities, the lawsuit says.

And Lloyd's husband, in a third count, is suing for the loss of "services, society and consortium" of his wife.
At this distance, it's easy to be snarky: Can the mother of a Little Leaguer not know that it's a bad idea to sit anywhere near the area where catchers are warming pitchers? (It's also a good idea not to sit behind the first baseman when he tries to warm up the infield.) Can a typical 11-year old Little Leaguer really throw hard enough to break glass, much less someone's face?

But even assuming Ms. Lloyd really was seriously injured, why would she sue a little kid?

I don't pretend to know what the law may be in New Jersey, but -- in Illinois -- there may have been no one else to sue.

In Illinois, the Baseball Facility Act, 745 ILCS 38/1 et seq., and the Recreational Use of Land and Water Areas Act, 745 ILCS 65/1 et seq., would operate to severely limit Ms. Lloyd's choices about whom to sue.

And this isn't just a blogger speculating: Debbie Vaughn was hit by an 11-year old's errant warm-up throw in 2005 while watching her son's game at West Frankfort Park in downstate Franklin County -- and the Illinois Appellate Court found that these statutes barred her claims against the West Frankfort Recreation Association and its alleged agent, Jarrod Barton, the coach (and father) of the kid who uncorked the errant throw. Vaughn v. Barton, 402 Ill.App.3d 1135, 933 N.E.2d 355 (5th Dist. 2010). However, just because there may not be a statute (yet) immunizing kids from the consequences of making bad throws while warming up to play baseball doesn't mean it's a particularly good idea to try and sue a kid.

If you look at the news coverage swirling around the Migliaccio case, you'll note that the young man's father and the young man's attorney are both angry that Little League is not coming to the boy's defense. The important part of this, though, is that the Migliaccio family's homeowner's insurance will be providing a defense for this suit.

And bringing a motion to dismiss in rather short order, I expect.

Wednesday, June 27, 2012

Tributes pouring in for Justice Joseph Gordon

The email took me by surprise this afternoon: "The Appellate Lawyers Association regrets to inform you of the death of Justice Joseph Gordon of the Illinois Appellate Court."

The Chicago Daily Law Bulletin reports tonight that Justice Gordon, 79, suffered a fatal heart attack while working at his desk.

I had the pleasure and privilege of appearing in front of Justice Gordon many times but my favorite memory of Justice Gordon concerns a case that never even got briefed.

Justice Gordon conducted the one and only Rule 310 Prehearing Conference I've ever had in that court. I'd been hired to represent a young doctor in an appeal from a judgement obtained against him by the State of Illinois. I can't go into the particulars, of course. I can say that the young doctor and his original attorney turned down a number of chances to settle in the trial court and they shouldn't have. By the time the doctor saw the light, however, the State was no longer willing to settle. Nevertheless, Justice Gordon made a heroic effort -- and he persisted, even when the State became intransigent. Indeed, the more the State refused, the harder he tried. It was a long and ultimately frustrating day. The prehearing conference didn't work, in the end, but I will remember Justice Gordon's effort if I live to be 110.

Justice Gordon will be sorely missed.

Saturday, June 23, 2012

Arbitration participant's specific questions and some general answers

There's a disclaimer on this blog that reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
Nothing in this blog is meant to create, nor should it be construed by you as creating, an attorney-client relationship. Sending an email to this blog or leaving a comment to a post does not create, nor should it be construed by you as creating, an attorney-client relationship.
Nevertheless, someone identified as "MC" left a question on an older page two post recently. MC's questions, lightly edited:
I went to an arbitration hearing the other day. I was the plaintiff in a small property-damage claim, against a substandard carrier. I presented my side to the arbitrators as did the defendant. I was not aware of Supreme Court Rule 90(c) until after the arbitration meeting. The arbitrators never asked me for a copy of the repair estimate I had with me. After the arbitration meeting, the clerk at the Skokie Courthouse told me that I had won, but that the award was zero dollars because I did not prove damages. If I reject the award, will the same arbitrators be involved in reviewing the 90(c) package that I will be submitting? Why didn't any of the arbitrators ask for my damage estimates?
If MC has these kinds of questions about court-annexed arbitration in Cook County, others may as well.

Failure to be aware of Rule 90(c). "[A] party who chooses to proceed pro se must comply with the same rules of proceedings as an attorney." Paddock v. Department of Employment Security, 184 Ill.App.3d 945, 540 N.E.2d 1053, 1055 (1st Dist. 1989). "A pro se litigant while traversing the procedural minefield of litigation is bound to strict compliance with the requirements of the statute." Dolido v. Zenith Radio Corp., 194 Ill.App.3d 268, 272, 550 N.E.2d 1225 (1st Dist. 1990). "While reviewing courts are open to all persons who seek redress of their grievances, a party's decision to appear pro se does not relieve that party from adhering as nearly as possible to the requirements of the rules of practice enunciated by our supreme court," Peeples v. Johnsburg. 403 Ill. App. 3d 333, 335, 932 N.E.2d 612 (2nd Dist. 2010, quoting McCutcheon v. Chicago Principals Association, 159 Ill. App. 3d 955, 960, 513 N.E.2d 55 (1st Dist. 1987).

In other words, folks like MC are free to proceed without a lawyer ("pro se" merely means "for oneself") but they are assumed to know everything that a lawyer should know about how to conduct their hearing. Think about that: Lawyers have years of specialized education and must pass a licensing exam. And not all lawyers are equally comfortable in court; there are many, many great lawyers who would be completely lost in a courtroom... or even at an arbitration. So... people are free to represent themselves in an arbitration, but is it really a really good idea?

Rule 90 is no magic talisman. What Rule 90(c) does is provide a streamlined method for the introduction of evidence at -- and only at -- the arbitration hearing.

The rule is not meant to confer an advantage on either party; it's purpose is to allow a complete case to be presented and decided in a two-hour window. As a practical matter, especially in personal injury cases, it makes it much easier for plaintiffs to present their proof. If the requirements of the rule are met, medical records and bills are presumptively admitted; there's no need to try and get a doctor to come in and testify, because the doctor's diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis are all in that neatly arranged, page-numbered 90(c) package. (That's a huge reason why there is such a discrepancy between amounts awarded at arbitration and trial: In smaller cases, it's difficult, and sometimes impossible -- at least financially -- to get a doctor in to authenticate records, and without the automatic admissibility of 90(c), a lot of the stuff that's right there for the arbitrators to see is never seen by the judge or jury at trial.)

The arbitrators never asked me for a copy of my repair estimate. Maybe it's different on Judge Judy or The Peoples' Court, but at an arbitration hearing, the parties are responsible for presenting their own case.

I believe arbitration is statewide now but, when the program came to Cook County, it was as part of the first expansion of the concept from a pilot program in Winnebago County. I was in the first class of Cook County arbitrators somewhere around 20 years ago; our training materials included a video from Rockford. If I recall correctly, the arbitrators in the videos asked a lot more questions than was ever customary in this jurisdiction. But these questions were meant to clarify or assist the arbitrators' understanding of the facts presented; there was never a suggestion that arbitrators should ask questions that would lead a party through his or her case-in-chief.

A timely rejection of an arbitration award gets a case back on the trial call. There is no second chance at arbitration. The streamlined procedures of Rule 90 will not apply at trial. And if it is difficult for a party to represent himself or herself at an arbitration, it is that much harder to proceed pro se at trial.

Conclusion. We live in interesting times. While many new law school graduates are begging for jobs, and with lots of lawyers at all experience levels hurting for business during this never-ending recession, the Illinois Supreme Court has just adopted Rule 10-100, creating a Commission on Access to Justice "to promote, facilitate, and enhance equal access to justice with an emphasis on access to the Illinois civil courts and administrative agencies for all people, particularly the poor and vulnerable."

It seems there are more lawyers, and more people needing lawyers, than ever.

It might be good to figure out how to get these folks together in ways that would benefit all of them.

Wednesday, June 20, 2012

Update on last Friday's post on the parlous prospects for new law grads

ABA Journal Law News Now updated its story on the Boston law firm looking to hire an associate for $10,000 a year: More than 50 people have now applied.

Of course, the job also comes with a bus pass (and a clothing allowance and other benefits).

Yesterday, the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin carried a story about a report issued by Law School Transparency, a Tennessee-based nonprofit group that pushed for law schools to report accurate job data. According to their report, only 55% of 2011 law school graduates found full-time, long-term legal employment within nine months of graduation.

Mary Kate Malone's article for the Law Bulletin says that, locally, 2011 University of Chicago graduates fared best, with 88% finding full-time, long-term legal work. On the other hand, only 48% of Loyola's 2011 law graduates had full-time, long-term legal work -- and only 49% and 39%, respectively, for graduates of IIT-Chicago Kent and DePaul.

Yikes.

The Law School Transparency website can be accessed here.

And while we're on the subject of yesterday's Law Bulltein...

You may have noticed Jerry Crimmins's article about Ald. Edward M. Burke's City Club speech Monday about the forthcoming 200th anniversary of the Battle of Fort Dearborn. With Ald. Burke's sponsorship, the Chicago City Council passed a resolution earlier this month also commemorating the anniversary.

The City Council resolution, Crimmins writes, "says that 'as a result of the battle, 35 soldiers, 12 militiamen, two women and 12 children were killed' on the Fort Dearborn side, and 'as many as 15 Native Americans were slain.'"

Just a hunch here, but I'm pretty sure that Crimmins's assignment on this story was anything but accidental. Crimmins is the author of Fort Dearborn, a carefully researched, entertaining historical novel, published in 2006. The Battle of Fort Dearborn is, unsurprisingly, the climax of the narrative.



(And, yes, the novel is still available on Amazon.)

Friday, June 15, 2012

Congratulations 2012 law school graduates: What were you thinking?

This is a post I started writing weeks ago -- but it seems like every time I opened my email, there was something new to add.

I started out looking at the terrible story out of Boston: A firm there offered a job paying $10,000 a year -- and got 32 applicants. (The link is to Martha Neil's May 31 article on ABA Journal Law News Now.)

Neil's post linked to Lisa van der Pool's May 31 post on the Boston Business Journal website. Ms. van der Pool's post included a screen grab of the Boston College Law School website where the below-minimum-wage job was posted; I've grabbed it in turn:



The job is not quite as terrible as the articles make it sound. Pay is estimated, based on what the new attorney can likely bill and collect on his or her own case load -- but if you read the ad, the firm would also provide malpractice and health coverage, a bus pass (so the impecunious lawyer can get to and from work), and even an employer-paid clothing allowance.

On the other hand, Boston College claims that the median salary of its 2010 graduates nine months after graduation was a heck of a lot more than $10,000 and a bus pass, even in the public sector:



Of course, charts like this recall to mind the phrase often associated with Mark Twain (though he attributed it to Benjamin Disraeli -- and Disraeli wasn't the source either): "There are lies, damned lies and statistics."

Who responds to salary surveys? Those who got the prestige clerkships and those who hooked on with silk-stocking firms -- or the ones flipping burgers?

In an article that appeared in the January 9, 2011 New York Times ("Is Law School a Losing Game?"), David Segal quoted Indiana University Law Professor William Henderson as saying, "Enron-type accounting standards have become the norm."

When a law school claims that x percent of its graduates are employed nine months after graduation, it means employed anywhere -- whether the job requires a law degree or not.
A law grad, for instance, counts as "employed after nine months" even if he or she has a job that doesn't require a law degree. Waiting tables at Applebee's? You're employed. Stocking aisles at Home Depot? You're working, too.
Segal's 2011 article said that February 15 was the magic date on which employment is calculated for purposes of the all-important U.S. News & World Report law school rankings.
A number of law schools hire their own graduates, some in hourly temp jobs that, as it turns out, coincide with the magical date. Last year, for instance, Georgetown Law sent an e-mail to alums who were "still seeking employment." It announced three newly created jobs in admissions, paying $20 an hour. The jobs just happened to start on Feb. 1 and lasted six weeks.
(Segal noted that Georgetown insisted that none of these graduates were counted as employed, but his skepticism about this claim seemed apparent.)

I couldn't help but think about the part-time Georgetown jobs when I read Jerry Crimmins's June 1 article for the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, "University of Chicago pays for jobs for some 2011 law grads." Crimmins reported that the U of C released a chart (like the BC Law chart, above) which showed "stellar occupational achievements" by its Class of 2011.
The chart says 199 of 203 graduates, or 98 percent, got jobs. Of those, 181, or 89.2 percent, got jobs that require passage of the bar.

More than half, 117 of last year's graduates took jobs in law firms. Eighty-three of those grads took jobs in the nation's biggest firms with 501 or more lawyers.

Twenty were hired in highly sought after judicial clerkships.

The median starting salary for full-time, employed graduates of the class of 2011 is $160,000. This is based on salaries reported by 178 of 199 employed graduates.
However, according to Crimmins's article, the University of Chicago also announced that "at least 11 percent of its class of 2011 graduates took jobs that were funded by the law school," jobs "that are good for only one year."

In the current climate, it is perhaps not so surprising that the U of C is admitting that it has created jobs for a large portion of its 2011 graduating class.

Since David Segal's January 2011 article in the New York Times, suits have been filed against a number of law schools around the country, alleging various theories of fraud and misrepresentation, particularly in the disclosure of post-graduation salary and employment prospects.

The first of these may have been filed last summer against Michigan's Thomas M. Cooley Law School and New York Law School. Earlier this year, suit was filed against three Chicago law schools (DePaul, Kent and John Marshall). Ameet Sachdev's article for the February 2, 2012 Chicago Tribune reported that the "Chicago suits were part of coordinated attack on legal education mounted by New York plaintiffs attorneys David Anziska, Jesse Strauss and Frank Raimond. Nine additional suits were filed against schools in Florida, California, New York and Delaware." (See also, Michael Vasquez's March 22, 2012 article in the Miami Herald, "UM, St. Thomas law schools subject of fraud lawsuit" and a February 2, 2012 article in the Wall Street Journal, "Corporate News: Law Grads Claim Schools Misled," by Joe Palazzolo and Jennifer Smith.)

Now, even newly minted law school graduates should know that the mere filing of a lawsuit does not guarantee success -- and, indeed, the first results are encouraging for the law school defendants. Deborah L. Cohen reports in the June 2012 ABA Journal ("Few Jobs, But a Rack of Suits") that New York Supreme Court Justice Melvin Schweitzer dismissed the suit against New York Law School on March 21. According to Cohen's article, Schweitzer wrote, "The court does not view these post-graduate employment statistics to be misleading in a material way for a reasonable consumer acting reasonably."

In other words, if you were smart enough to get into law school, you should have been smart enough to see through the rosy employment and salary figures put out by all the law schools. A similar theme was sounded in Sachdev's February 2 Tribune article.
William Robinson, president of the American Bar Association, told Reuters in an interview last month, "It's inconceivable to me that someone with a college education, or a graduate-level education, would not know before deciding to go to law school that the economy has declined over the last several years and that the job market out there is not as opportune as it might have been five, six, seven, eight years ago."
Not as opportune?

On June 7, Lorene Yue posted an article on the Crain's Chicago Business website, "2011 law grads' job market worst in 17 years." Shaun Zinck's article for the June 7 Chicago Daily Law Bulletin was headlined, "Stats show dismal job market for law grads." Debra Cassens Weiss's June 7 article on ABA Journal Law News Now was headlined "Only 65 Percent of 2011 Law Grads Have Jobs Requiring Bar Passage, a Record Low."

Each of these articles cited to a report issued by the National Association for Law Placement (press release, selected findings).

These findings, bad as they are, may be understated. Ms. Yue, reviewing the complete NALP report noted, optimistically, that three Chicago area schools, the University of Chicago, Northwestern and Loyola, had employment rates that surpassed the national average calculated by NALP. (A chart from Ms. Yue's article is reproduced below.)



Encouraging, no?

Well... no. Remember Jerry Crimmins's article about the University of Chicago acknowledging that it created jobs for 11% of its graduates?

But though law jobs are scarce, even for graduates of the most prestigious schools, there's still plenty of debt to go around. Just yesterday, Rachel M. Zahorsky posted an article on ABA Journal Law News Now, "Law Grads ‘Indentured Servants’ to Loans, Law Prof Says; Law School Crisis a Symptom of Weak Economy." According to that article, the average law school graduate can expect a sheepskin and $150,000 in student loans.

That number may be a little high, at least as an average. Greg Moran, writing in the March 31, 2012 San Diego Union-Tribune quotes a U.S. News & World Report survey about how much 2011 law school graduates owe after graduation. Those owing the most come from these schools:

John Marshall Law School (Chicago): $165,178
California Western School of Law (San Diego): $153,145
Thomas Jefferson School of Law (San Diego): $153,006
American University (Washington, D.C.): $151,318
New York Law School (New York): $146,230
Phoenix School of Law (Arizona): $145,357
Southwestern Law School (Los Angeles): $142,606
Columbus School of Law at Catholic University of America (Washington, D.C.): $142,222
Northwestern University [Chicago]: $139,101
Pace University (White Plains, N.Y.): $139,007

Anyway, congratulations to the Class of 2012. Stop reading and go back to studying for the bar exam. Maybe it will work out for you.

Monday, May 28, 2012

Pictures from today's Norwood Park Memorial Day Parade

The annual Norwood Park Memorial Day Parade wound its way through the neighborhood earlier today. The Edison Park American Legion and the American Flag Coalition led the way.



You can't have a parade in Chicago without politicians. Groups for State Senator John Mulroe (D-10) Ald. Mary O'Connor (D-41) represented the Democrats at the front of the parade; groups for County Commissioner Peter Silvestri (17th) and State Rep. Michael McAuliffe (R-20) represented the Republicans at the front of the parade.





Cook County Metropolitan Water Reclamation District Commissioner Frank Avila was further back in the parade, but we'll keep all the politicians together in this post.


But it wouldn't be much of a parade without a grand marshal, motorcycles, marching bands....






Want more? Turn to page two.

Tuesday, May 22, 2012

Judge Thomas J. Carroll appointed to Felton vacancy

The Illinois Supreme Court has appointed Judge Thomas J. Carroll to the countywide vacancy created by the recent death of Judge Donna Phelps Felton.

Judge Carroll's appointment became effective last Friday and will expire on December 1, 2014. At the time of this appointment, Judge Carroll was serving on the bench by appointment to the McSweeney Moore vacancy in Cook County's 3rd Subcircuit.

Judge Carroll was one of several candidates to file for the McSweeney Moore vacancy in the March primary, but Carroll and all the other hopefuls in that race withdrew in favor of Daniel R. Degnan, Executive Director of the Cook County Employee Pension Fund and the son of former state senator and one-time director of the mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs, Timothy F. Degnan. Daniel R. Degnan was unopposed in March; he face no opposition in November.

Prior to his initial elevation to the bench, Judge Carroll was a criminal defense attorney. He has also worked as an Assistant Public Defender.

Tuesday, May 15, 2012

Sixty Cook County Judges file for November retention ballot

Sixty Cook County Circuit Court Judges elected or retained in 2006 have filed to appear on the retention ballot in the November 2012 general election, according to information furnished by the Illinois Secretary of State.

The last day for a judge to provide a declaration of candidacy was May 6, according to the Illinois State Board of Elections website.

If normal patterns hold, some of these jurists will withdraw their retention bids between now and the election. Three of the judges on this list are serving on the Appellate Court; two, Maureen Elizabeth Connors and P. Scott Neville, Jr., won their respective races in the March Democratic Primary and face no opposition in November. They are likely to withdraw their retention bids. On the other hand, Judge Stuart E. Palmer was assigned by the Illinois Supreme Court to serve on the Appellate Court. He would have to be retained in office as a Circuit Court Judge in order to continue in his assignment on the Appellate Court.

Also on the list of judges currently seeking retention is Cynthia Brim. Currently, Judge Brim has been removed from all judicial duties by order of the Executive Committee of the Circuit Court of Cook County. The suspension came after Judge Brim was arrested at the Daley Center, charged with allegedly shoving a Cook County Sheriff's deputy and tossing a set of keys at a security checkpoint.

One Justice of the Appellate Court, James Fitzgerald Smith, has filed for retention in the First Appellate District (Cook County). Several downstate Appellate Court justices have also filed for retention, Tom M. Lytton and Daniel L. Schmidt (3rd District), John Turner (4th District), and Melissa Ann Chapman (5th District). No Supreme Court Justice will be on the retention ballot in Cook County; Justice Rita B. Garman has filed for retention in the downstate 4th District.

A complete list of Cook County Circuit Court Judges who have filed for retention in November follows:
  • Martin S. Agran
  • Patricia Banks
  • Ronald F. Bartkowicz
  • Carole Kamin Bellows
  • Maura Slattery Boyle
  • Daniel Patrick Brennan
  • Cynthia Brim
  • Rodney Hughes Brooks
  • Mary Margaret Brosnahan
  • Robert Lopez Cepero
  • Gloria Chevere
  • Matthew E. Coghlan
  • Maureen Elizabeth Connors
  • Grace G. Dickler
  • Christopher Donnelly
  • Loretta Eadie-Daniels
  • James D. Egan
  • Kathy M. Flanagan
  • Ellen L. Flannigan
  • Peter Flynn
  • Raymond Funderburk
  • Joyce Marie Murphy Gorman
  • Catherine Marie Haberkorn
  • Orville E. Hambright
  • Pamela E. Hill Veal
  • Carol M. Howard
  • Garritt E. Howard
  • Michael J. Howlett, Jr.
  • Anthony A. Iosco
  • Moshe Jacobius
  • Edward R. Jordan
  • Paul A. Karkula
  • Joseph G. Kazmierski, Jr.
  • Stuart F. Lubin
  • Marvin P. Luckman
  • Marcia Maras
  • Jill C. Marisie
  • James Michael McGing
  • Mike McHale
  • James Patrick Murphy
  • Thomas W. Murphy
  • Lisa Ruble Murphy
  • Marya Nega
  • P. Scott Neville, Jr.
  • Patrick W. "Pat" O'Brien
  • Joan Margaret O'Brien
  • Ramon Ocasio III
  • Stuart E. Palmer
  • Lee Preston
  • Mary Colleen Roberts
  • Thomas David Roti
  • Drella C. Savage
  • Colleen F. Sheehan
  • Diane M. Shelley
  • Bill Taylor
  • James M. Varga
  • Carl Anthony Walker
  • Richard F. Walsh
  • Camille E. Willis
  • E. Kenneth Wright, Jr.

Saturday, May 12, 2012

FWIW among this year's Kogan Award winners

The Chicago Bar Association's 23rd Annual Herman Kogan Media Awards were handed out Wednesday, May 9 at a luncheon at Petterinos in Chicago's Loop. WLS-TV anchor Ron Magers served as the keynote speaker.

Tribune reporters David Jackson and Gary Marx were honored in the print category for their series "Fugitives from Justice," about criminals who have fled overseas to avoid prosecution. In addition to the Kogan award, "Fugitives from Justice" has received the Watchdog Award for Excellence in Public Interest Reporting from the Chicago Headline Club and a Medill Medal for Courage in Journalism. "Fugitives from Justice" was also a finalist for this year's Pulitzer Prize in the investigative reporting category.

Mark Suppelsa and Marsha Bartel of WGN-TV received a Kogan Award for their broadcast series "Pension Games," a multimedia series (in conjunction with the Chicago Tribune) that exposed waste and fraud in the state pension system. The "Pension Games" series has also won two Lisagor Awards from the Chicago Headline Club and the 2012 Richard H. Driehaus Foundation Award for Investigative Reporting from the Better Government Association.

The third Kogan Award winner, in the online category, was yours truly. Photographic evidence is supplied above for the understandably skeptical. The particular post singled out was "In defense of the Supreme Court's recent practice of recalling appointed judges who've lost in a primary election."

In addition to the three Kogan Awards, the CBA gave out three Meritorious Achievement Awards on Wednesday.

John Marshall Law School Professor and Chicago Daily Law Bulletin columnist Timothy P. O'Neill was given a Meritorious Achievement Award for his anti-death penalty column, "Some Advice: Let's Leave Well Enough Alone."

Angela Caputo of the Chicago Reporter received a Meritorious Achievement Award for "Out at First," about the Chicago Housing Authority's "one strike policy" of seeking the eviction of families when any person residing with that family is accused of any crime. "Out at First" won a Sigma Delta Chi Award from the Society of Professional Journalists in the category of Public Service in Magazine Journalism (Regional/Local Circulation) and a Lisagor Award from the Chicago Headline Club in the category of general-interest publication, circulation less than 20,000.

The third Meritorious Achievement Award went to Cate Cahan and Robert Wildeboer of WBEZ Radio for the series, "Whatever Happened to Marcus?" This series also received a Lisagor Award from the Chicago Headline Club in the radio category.

The Herman Kogan Media Awards are named for the late Chicago newsman Herman Kogan. A reporter, feature writer, columnist and editor at various times with the Chicago Tribune, Sun-Times, and the old Daily News, Kogan also won three Emmys during a mid-1960's stint as assistant general manager of news at WFLD. Along the way, Kogan also hosted two programs on WFMT radio, "Critics Choice" and "Writing and Writers."

Kogan was the author of several books on Chicago themes including Big Bill of Chicago, a biography of William Hale Thompson (with Lloyd Wendt); Lords of the Levee: the Story of Bathhouse John and Hinky Dink (also with Wendt -- also released under the title Bosses in Lusty Chicago: the Story of Bathhouse John and Hinky Dink) and The Great Fire, Chicago, 1871 (with Robert Cromie).

The First Century, the story of the Chicago Bar Association's first 100 years, was a solo effort.

Friday, May 11, 2012

Forgetfulness may not be a sign of aging, just the result of a change of venue

A colleague told me recently that while driving to work he'd thought of a long list of things to accomplish but -- just as soon as he set foot in his office -- he couldn't remember anything on his list. "I must be getting old," he complained.

A note by Marc Silver in the "Next" section of this month's National Geographic provides a happier explanation. He writes of research published by Notre Dame's Gabe Radvansky that suggests that people simply don't remember things as well when they cross through a doorway. Silver summarizes Professor Radvansky's conclusion: "Change of venue makes the brain 'push old stuff out and focus on what's going on now,' a good strategy for cavemen heading from forest to field."

Radvansky's paper, which was published in the Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, may be accessed here. Another summary of Radvansky's work, by Susan Guibert, can be found on the Notre Dame website.

Tuesday, May 08, 2012

Is pulling down an opponent's campaign signs a crime?

The answer to this question (and all lawyers out there are invited to say it along with me) is: It depends. Let me explain.

The possible pilfering of campaign signs is in the news today because of an article by Jeremy Gorner in today's Chicago Tribune, about the arrest of Carl Boyd on the night before the March 20 primary.

Boyd was the winner of the Democratic Primary for Circuit Court Judge in Cook County's 2nd Judicial Subcircuit. He faces no opposition on the ballot in November.

Quoting from the linked Tribune article:
According to a police report, a Chicago police sergeant spotted Boyd removing [Chester] Slaughter campaign signs and placing them in the trunk of his 2000 BMW near 119th and Halsted streets early on March 19. [Slaughter was one of Boyd's three primary opponents.]

Police reported recovering 12 of Slaughter's campaign signs from Boyd's car.

Boyd was arrested on a misdemeanor theft charge, booked at the Calumet District police lockup and released later in the morning after posting $200 in cash for bail.
What's missing from this account is an essential element that might make Mr. Boyd's alleged conduct into a crime.

I have no opinion as to whether Mr. Boyd did or did not do something in violation of the law.

However, in 1984, in Members of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772, the United States Supreme Court upheld a city ordinance that prohibited the erection of campaign signs on public property. Most cities and villages in Cook County also have some sign ordinance prohibiting campaign signs on public property; some even have provisions that purportedly allow municipalities to bill campaigns whose signs are removed from streetlights or public parkways by public employees. In this sense, signs on lampposts or posted at intersections may be considered abandoned and might be removed by anyone.

On the other hand, uprooting and removing a campaign sign planted by a homeowner in his or her own front lawn might very well constitute misdemeanor theft.

In other words, if Candidate A is pulled over by the police and is found to have a whole bunch of Candidate B's signs in the back seat, it may look a tad unseemly -- but where those signs came from is the key factor in determining whether Candidate A has committed a crime.

Sunday, May 06, 2012

Judge's daughter in the running for Miss USA

Beauty contests are beyond the usual scope of this blog, but a Facebook message this evening got me looking into the upcoming Miss USA Pageant.

The next Miss USA will be crowned June 3 in a live NBC television broadcast. To boost interest in the contest, the pageant organizers are running an online election: Anyone can vote for their favorite Miss USA contestant; the winner is guaranteed a place among the pageant semifinalists.

The Illinois representative in the Miss USA contest (shown above) is Ashley Hooks; her proud father is Cook County Circuit Court Judge William H. Hooks. It was Judge Hooks who sent me the Facebook message this evening, looking to spread the word about his daughter's Miss USA bid. "People can vote on line up to 10 times per day, per email account," Judge Hooks wrote. Voting is underway now, and continues through June 2 at noon ET. Votes can be taken at this link or on Facebook or Twitter.

Wednesday, May 02, 2012

Too much enthusiasm over Osama's anniversary?

There were an awful lot of Westerns on TV when I was a kid (and I watched nearly as much television as the Bill Murray character in Scrooged) -- Maverick, Have Gun Will Travel, Gunsmoke, The Rifleman, Bonanza.... There were a lot of old Western movies on TV, too -- with John Wayne, of course, but also Alan Ladd or Randolph Scott; Gene Autry and Roy Rogers were always singing on one channel or another.

So I imbibed a heady draught of what I'll call the Western Ethos. Among these principles is that, sometimes, a man is so evil or so corrupt, and the law is so weak or unavailable, the bad guy simply can't be arrested and brought to justice. The hero is forced to take the law into his own hands, and he does what needs doin'.

The important thing is that the hero is not happy about it. It's the grizzled prospector or the comely schoolmarm who tries to offer comfort, if not absolution, just before the end credits roll: "If ever a man needed killin', that one did."

Maybe the hero can stay on as Sheriff, or become Sheriff -- but not to start his own reign of terror, but rather to bring law and order and schools and churches and marriageable ladies into town, to bring the blessings of civilization and the Rule of Law to the hitherto untamed frontier. Maybe, like Gary Cooper in High Noon, he's so disgusted, not just by what his alleged friends and neighbors didn't do, but by what he himself had to do, that he takes off the badge forever and goes off to start a ranch someplace.

Everyone thinks that Jimmy Stewart's character, in The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance, is the man who rid Shinbone of its most feared outlaw. The naive lawyer rises rapidly in politics after the showdown, eventually becoming senator from the new state that he helped to hew from the wilderness.

Only he's not the man everyone thinks he is. He knew what really happened, and so did his wife (played by Vera Miles), and so (of course) did John Wayne. Towards the end of Stewart's career, the Stewart and Miles characters come back to Shinbone for Wayne's funeral, and Stewart tries to set the record straight. But, as the newspaperman tells him at the end, "This is the West, sir. When the legend becomes fact, print the legend." The point is that Stewart neither wanted nor deserved the accolades heaped on him as a result of the death of Liberty Valance; he took no satisfaction from it.

This brings us to Osama bin Laden. It is an article of faith for me, as an American lawyer, that "justice" can not be meted out with helicopters and Navy SEALs and firefights. Yet, as an American realist, steeped in the cultural values I absorbed through a small-screen black and white TV, I can't help but agree that, "If ever a man needed killin', that one did."

It's just not a cause for celebration. And the man who did what needed doin' should never, ever be perceived as gloating about it. For that reason, surely, President Obama is ill-served by some supporters who recently 'questioned' whether Gov. Romney would have given the order to 'take out' Osama.

In one clip I heard, Gov. Romney was 'accused' of expressing concern (back in 2007) about violating Pakistani sovereignty in pursuit of bin Laden, and that he should be made to 'explain' himself. Well, no explanation is required.

In 2007 most of us thought bin Laden might be hiding in caves on the Pakistani side of the Afghan border; we had no idea that he had built himself a compound for himself in the shadow of a Pakistani military academy in Abbottabad, a city of about 500,000 just 60 miles or so away from the Pakistani capital of Islamabad. Jane Perlez, in an article posted on the New York Times website one year ago today, reported that, "In an ironic twist, the academy [next door to the bin Laden compound] was visited just last month by the Pakistani military chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, where he proclaimed that Pakistan had 'cracked' the forces of terrorism, an assessment that was greeted with skepticism in Washington."

Until we knew that the Pakistani government was either deliberately covering up bin Laden's presence or so incompetent that it could not find him in plain sight, everyone was right to be concerned about possibly violating an ally's sovereign territory. Once we knew bin Laden's whereabouts, however, we also knew that we could not inform our gallant Pakistani ally in advance of any raid. Prior notice would almost guarantee bin Laden's successful escape. Nevertheless, sending troops across a national border without permission is called an invasion; it is an act of war. There was, accordingly, even at that late stage, extremely good reason to be concerned about sending in SEAL Team Six. Fortunately, it was in the best interests of both the United States and Pakistan to make nice with each other after the fact -- President Obama, according to an AP account by Kimberly Dozier and David Espo, was careful to stress that he called Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari after the raid to brief him on what had already happened. Pakistan accepted the President's explanation, at least to the extent that we are not now in a state of war with that nation.

In the western movies, the good guy who is forced to take out the bad guy is scarred by his act, not enthused. He knows he's done something to prevent greater wrongs in the future, but only by committing a wrong himself. The townspeople may be grateful, but the hero can not fully accept their cheers. He must live with what he has done. So too must President Obama. I am certain that the President must have agonized about authorizing the mission. He did what he did with resolve, yes, but also with regret -- and any man or woman worthy of the title of President of the United States would have been similarly stressed in those same circumstances. The President's more bloodthirsty supporters need to be reined in; their misguided enthusiasm diminishes all of us.

Sunday, April 29, 2012

On the exceptional importance of Law Day

Law Day is Tuesday, May 1.

Law Day was invented as a Cold War-era response to May Day. It was first observed in 1958; the date was recognized by statute in 1961.

Area lawyers have received a special issue of the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin every year just in time for Law Day, but other than that I can't think of too many ways in which Law Day has been celebrated in this country.

I think that's a mistake.

Forget about the Cold War origins of the day, or that Law Day was set up to compete with May Day for the hearts and minds of future American workers. Law Day has been set aside to commemorate the importance of law in America, and there's nothing more important than the law in the development and history of our nation.

To talk about the singular import of law in America is to acknowledge American exceptionalism. The so-called doctrine of American exceptionalism has more or less been hijacked by some on the political right in this country, to justify all sorts of behaviors, interventions, or attitudes. (For example, the attitude that 'we need not join with other nations in international agreements because we are different from – better than – other nations.')

But, if that's what you think of when you think of American exceptionalism, you're just wrong, wrong, wrong.

What makes America the exceptional nation is the way the law binds us together as a people.

All countries have laws, of course. But every other nation on the earth has been defined in terms of a particular people in a particular place. A motherland. A fatherland. And the people there? All one tribe. All one ethnicity. No outsiders need apply. So after the fall or Rome, we find all sorts of Franks gathered in former province of Gaul, and voilà, we have the Frankish kingdom. And, 1,500 years later, we have France -- and North Africans segregated in French ghettos unable to meaningfully assimilate into the French nation, unable to hope for full participation in the life of their adopted homeland.

A westerner can live in Japan. He can learn Japanese. He can eat Japanese foods. If he can hit a curve ball he may even become a hero to Japanese baseball fans. But he can not become Japanese. He will always be a gaijin. In the current issue of the Wilson Quarterly, in an article entitled "Japan Shrinks," Nicholas Eberstadt observes that, in 2009, Japan naturalized only one-third as many new citizens as Switzerland. And Switzerland has "a population only six percent the size of Japan's and a reputation of its own for standoffishness."

America is different; we can not be pigeonholed as a particular people living in a particular place. America itself has been a dynamic nation, growing by leaps and bounds from the original 13 Colonies, and a citizen from Massachusetts is no more an American than any citizen from Alaska, Hawaii or California.

Of course, George Washington, in his Farewell Address, wrote that his fellow Americans "have the same religion, manners, habits, and political principles," with only "slight shades of difference."

Washington had his reasons for stressing unity -- in his time he would not have seen any reason to 'celebrate diversity' -- but what he said about all Americans having only 'slight shades of difference' wasn't all that true in 1796 and it certainly has gotten less and less true in the centuries since.

Except in the area of political principles.

As Jefferson wrote in the Declaration of Independence, "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. — That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." Or, as Lincoln paraphrased the Declaration of Independence at Gettysburg: "Four score and seven years ago, our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal."

As John Adams wrote in the Massachusetts Constitution, in America, our Founding Fathers formed "a government of laws and not of men."

One's original tribe, or nation, or people -– none of that is important to becoming an American. A person can come to America and -- if he or she embraces these foundational principles -- he or she can realize their greatest individual potential. The only limitation we put on the foreign-born is that they can not be President of the United States. But the son of a man from Kenya can become President.

Just before his death in 1919, Theodore Roosevelt wrote, "we should insist that if the immigrant who comes here in good faith becomes an American and assimilates himself to us, he shall be treated on an exact equality with everyone else, for it is an outrage to discriminate against any such man because of creed, or birthplace, or origin."

I realize that America has not always treated immigrants fairly -- and that not all immigrants have at all times and all places been fully welcomed into the American mainstream. Nevertheless, these are our ideals. Even if we have not always -- even if we have not often -- been perfect in our observation of and adherence to these principles, is that an intelligent basis upon which to reject our ideals altogether?

I get tired of cultural relativism, the idea that we're 'just as bad' as everyone else. In the summer of 2010, for example, you may recall the media circus over the proposed construction of the so-called 'Ground Zero Mosque.' Yes, there were loud, emotional protests. Bigots bellowed, but it wasn't just know-nothings and right-wingers. Some relatives of persons killed in the September 2001 attacks thought that the proposal was a provocation or, at best, insensitive.

But no house of worship, of any denomination, gets built anywhere in this country without some controversy. Any property on which a church is built comes off the local tax rolls, and somebody always has a question about parking or traffic. And there's often whispers about what might happen after the church is built. What happens later on if Fr. Murphy decides to open a soup kitchen or the Rev. Jones decides to make her sanctuary a sanctuary for the homeless, too?

You can tsk-tsk all you want about how opposition to church or synagogue or mosque-building is narrow-minded, selfish, even bigoted. But, please, tell me -- how do I find the Roman Catholic Cathedral in Riyadh?

Oh, wait, open Christian worship is illegal in the Saudi kingdom. In 2008 there were some 800,000 Catholics in Saudi Arabia, mostly Indian and Filipino guest workers, and not a single Catholic church to minister to their spiritual needs. A Saudi who converts to Christianity is courting death as an apostate. (And, remember, these are our gallant Saudi allies, not the Taliban.) Meanwhile, Wikipedia says that a 4,000 square foot Islamic community center opened at the 'Ground Zero Mosque' site in September 2011, and that the developer still hopes to go forward with plans for the 13 story building originally proposed.

Our "intolerance," though real enough, is a pretty weak strain, compared with the varieties found elsewhere in the world. Just today, according to this Reuters report, carried on the Huffington Post, gunmen opened up on Christians worshiping in a university lecture hall in the northern Nigerian city of Kano, killing 15 and wounding many more. According to the article, "Radical Islamist sect Boko Haram, which wants to carve out an Islamic state in northern Nigeria, has killed hundreds in bomb and gun attacks this year." No group has yet claimed responsibility for this attack, however, the article reports.

Christians worshiping in the Kenyan capital of Nairobi were attacked during a service by a grenade throwing man who had disguised himself as a congregant, according to another Reuters article posted today by the Chicago Tribune. The article says one man was killed; 16 other persons were injured. Again, no group has claimed responsibility, but the article reports that al-Shabaab, a Somali group that has ties to al-Queda, is angered by Kenyan intervention in support of the Somali government, which al-Shabaab is trying to overthrow.

No one can deny that we have our problems, but America really is an exceptional country.

Where else in the world can the mere embrace of certain 'self-evident truths' even potentially make you a fully integrated member of society except in America?

What makes America unique –- exceptional -– is that we are bound by our shared embrace of principles, not by kinship or religion or blood.

In other words, we are bound by law. By laws.

Thus, Law Day, whatever its artificial origins, should be -- and is -- a big deal.

And Law Day is a particularly appropriate time for us to remember and reflect upon the dangers confronting American belief in the rule of law –- which, as I’ve tried to show, ultimately, is our common, unifying thread as a people.

When we say we believe in the rule of law, we mean that we should be obedient to the law. We should respect and obey the law.

That has not always happened. Prohibition, for example, was a great American tragedy on many levels, and we here in Chicago suffer particularly from the legacy of Prohibition. But the Volstead Act was unevenly enforced (or not enforced at all) in American cities generally. It was not just thirsty urban working people and the bootleggers who supplied them that defied the law. Many in the upper classes thought the law was meant to apply to their workmen –- but never to them. As a law that could not be enforced, and was not enforced evenly –- as a law that a significant portion of the American people routinely ignored -– Prohibition undermined Americans' respect for the law generally.

There are a number of other, subsequent examples of this, perhaps not all as uncontroversial as the Volstead Act. But I suggest that, whenever we pass a law that we do not mean to enforce, or that we can not enforce evenly and fairly, we undermine respect for all laws –- and thereby jeopardize our national unity and, ultimately, our freedom.

Law Day is a good time to remember that we should encourage the passage only of laws that can be uniformly and fairly applied and enforced.

But although we say we want people to respect our laws, we also know that unthinking blind obedience to the law can itself be a great evil.

We have just finished our national observation of the Days of Remembrance, the days set aside by Congress each year to reflect upon the Holocaust.

One thing that has often struck me about the Nazis is how the Hitler regime papered over every outrage with a figleaf of legality. Hitler came to power in a legally constituted coalition government. There was a law passed to grant Hitler absolute power as dictator. The dissolution of the Reichstag was "legal." The persecution of Jews was all done under color of German law. Even the death camps were "legal" under German law. How many Nazis stood in the dock at Nuremberg claiming apparently genuine confusion that they should be prosecuted for following orders –- for simply following the law?

But those laws were evil. They violated basic norms of human civilization. They were certainly not worthy of anyone's respect.

That may be the most extreme illustration possible but perhaps it serves as a useful reminder of how blessed we are to live in a country with a constitution, a constitution that is deliberately difficult to amend.

And our Constitution provides a means of keeping a runaway legislature in check. At least since Marbury v. Madison in 1803, our Supreme Court has had the power to declare laws "unconstitutional," even ones that are passed by a "strong majority." My fellow Chicago attorney -- I won't name him, so as not to embarrass him -- was thus flat out wrong when he said recently:
Ultimately, I’m confident that the Supreme Court will not take what would be an unprecedented, extraordinary step of overturning a law that was passed by a strong majority of a democratically elected Congress. And I'd just remind conservative commentators that for years what we’ve heard is, the biggest problem on the bench was judicial activism or a lack of judicial restraint -- that an unelected group of people would somehow overturn a duly constituted and passed law. Well, this is a good example. And I'm pretty confident that this Court will recognize that and not take that step.
My fellow Chicago attorney feels quite strongly about the passage of a law that may become emblematic of the success or failure of his administration for generations to come. I express no opinion about that law here, and certainly no prediction about how the Supreme Court will assess that law. But it is important to remember that, in this country, no law, no matter how popular, or passed by how large a majority, can survive if it violates our Constitution. While we may disagree in good faith on particular cases, the principle itself is a wonderful thing, and part of what makes America exceptional.

Law Day is a good time to remind ourselves that the mere fact that a law has been passed by Congress or the General Assembly does not itself make that law either constitutional or worthy of respect. When we ask people to respect the law, we must always remember, in return, to make only laws that we, in good faith, believe to be constitutional -- and worthy of respect.

And one thing more -– in order to follow the law, in order to maintain our national respect for the law, our laws must be reasonably simple and understandable.

Americans who joined wagon trains heading west could carry with them only a few cherished possessions with which to start building their new life. If settlers brought with them only one book, it was probably a Bible. But if they brought two books, the other was probably a statute book -– all the laws of their state or territory compiled in a single volume.

There's no such thing as a statute book (book, singular) these days.

We've only just passed the end of this year’s tax season, so let's use tax law as an example. It appears to be a fact that the Internal Revenue Code now amounts to some 3.8 million words, more than four times the roughly 900,000 words that Shakespeare needed for every one of his known works –- all the comedies, all the tragedies, all the histories – even the sonnets.

We who are interested in politics and policy talk about taxation and who should pay what, and how the burden of taxation should be distributed but, sad to say, for the most part, we're all speaking from ignorance. I would go so far as to say that there is no one CPA or tax lawyer who has mastered each and every detail of the tax code -- and, even if such a triumph were possible, it would be of fleeting duration. The tax code will change next year. It changes every year.

I’m not picking on tax laws for anything other than seasonal reasons. The point is that our laws generally have become so cumbersome, so unwieldy, so specialized, so picayune, that it is impossible to claim knowledge of them all. We used to say that ignorance of the law is no excuse. But why isn't it? Lawyers don't always know the law; judges don't always know the law.

We lawyers laugh it off by saying 'that's why we call it practice -– because we never quite get all of it' – but it’s not really a laughing matter.

For a society where law, not blood, is the sinew that binds us together, the growing opacity, complexity and prolixity of our law is a real problem. How can we maintain our national unity through law, when the law which binds us together as a people becomes a more impenetrable mystery in each passing year? There is an increasingly urgent need to simplify and streamline our law so that it can continue to be worthy of the people's respect. That which can not be understood can surely not be applied fairly or evenly.

So Law Day really is a big deal for all of us. Don’t let it slip by unnoticed! We all have a part to play in helping insure that the United States will remain a nation of laws -- for ourselves and for our posterity. What will you do?

Saturday, April 21, 2012

Dr. Klumpp replies to Mr. Strom

For those who came in late: Today's guest post, by Albert J. Klumpp, PhD, is the third in a series that began with Dr. Klumpp reviews judicial countywide results. Next followed Mr. Strom responds to Dr. Klumpp, a guest post from reader Michael A. Strom. I am grateful to both contributors. I think their discussion has been stimulating and enlightening and I hope readers may agree.

Having performed both qualitative and quantitative research on judicial elections, I can attest that both approaches have their strengths and produce useful insights. So I'm always sorry to hear of anyone shunning one or the other. But many people do, and I respect Mr. Strom's being honest and upfront about his views on the matter. With regard to his comments about my work and my conclusions, I'll gladly address them.

One general comment first. Mr. Strom correctly points out that every primary has unique characteristics. Unquestionably, those characteristics do affect the importance of some variables from one primary to another. For instance, a summary of my analyses for the 2008 and 2010 primaries was posted in this blog two years ago and is still accessible; it shows the substantial difference in the pro-female vote that led to the different success rates for female candidates that Mr. Strom mentions. The same can be said for the values of slating in 2010 and 2012, and in many other situations. As I wrote in the DePaul Law Review last year,* "evidence scattered throughout the thirteen elections [that I analyzed] supports the notion that the idiosyncrasies of both the electorate and the top-of-ballot contests in each individual election can affect the results of judicial contests."

The longer-term measurements in the table that Mr. Leyhane posted last week (for 1986-2010 and 2000-2010) are simply for bigger-picture comparison to the 2012 results and aren't intended to compare one specific year to another specific year. I suppose a good idea in the future is to put a footnote to that effect below those kinds of tables. The alternative is to turn the table into a long string of individual-year measurements, which solves that problem but creates others. In any event, my intention was definitely not to suggest that all primaries are identical.

On the specific topics Mr. Strom addresses:

Dilution: Dilution occurs regardless of whether or not a given candidate is a "ringer." A second legitimate female candidate in a contest will divide the pro-female vote just as a ringer female will. The fact that more female candidates won in 2008 than in 2010 was due to a larger pro-female vote in 2008, as noted above, and was not because any of the females in either year were or were not ringers.

As for ringers specifically, at least in countywide contests, I haven't seen solid evidence of their use since the year 2000. There may have been a few scattered throughout the subcircuits, but again, this is beside the point. The subdividing of advantages like gender or ethnicity is clearly established in our electoral history. It predates the use of ringer candidates and is why ringer candidates were employed in the first place.

Faithful committeemen: With regard to Epstein and Patti in 2010, Epstein had advantages that Patti did not. Namely, the Tribune's endorsement and his half-million-dollar campaign that ran TV ads. And so Epstein got more votes than Patti. Remember, all of the variables present in each contest have their own effects, so all must be considered together.

It's true that slating did not do a lot for Judge Hill-Veal in 2010. It didn’t do a lot for any slated countywide candidate. Again, looking at my posted analysis for that year, the low value of the slating variable stands out. Actually, though, Hill-Veal's 2010 contest is not a good choice for any sort of comparison because it was overwhelmingly decided by one very unusual factor: name recognition. This was the contest that put Aurelia Pucinski on the Appellate Court and was the third contest that she had won strictly based on a large name-recognition boost that drew many votes away from her opponents. A politically well-known name in a judicial contest is an uncommon event, but when it happens, it usually overwhelms the other variables. (Unless a Mary Jane Theis comes along with a seven-figure campaign.)

Educated voters: I was puzzled by the comments pertaining to voter education. Possibly my use of the word "unless" in the original post was a bad choice, since it may have suggested that I advocate educational programs or a greater use of one source or another of voter information. Whatever the reason, I can assure Mr. Strom that nothing could be further from the truth. I do not seek and have never sought to perpetuate the views of "good government types" or anyone else in the judicial selection debate. I have never "lauded" any group of voters and have always been scrupulously neutral about comparing voting strategies or, for that matter, judicial selection systems. I present the evidence and let it speak for itself. To whatever extent certain individual findings support one viewpoint over another, so be it. But I approach the topic with complete neutrality.

On the size of the informed-voter group: Yes, the better-informed judicial voters are more regular voters than others, but even in small-turnout years, it's simply not a large group. It never has reached more than around twenty percent or so in any primary or general election since 1980—turnout level notwithstanding. (The statement that I have "entirely ignored the salutary effect of an exceptionally low vote total" is incorrect; see my published material.) The larger implications of those small numbers can and should be debated; that they are in fact small numbers is well-established.

Ballot position: Other published studies have demonstrated that the first ballot position has positive value and can affect the outcome of electoral contests. The finding in my own research is hardly groundbreaking. Nor is it news to the many political candidates who line up outside of elections offices as soon as a filing period begins simply for a chance at the first position.

With regard to the two contests I cited: Karen O'Malley, who held the first position, defeated Stanley Hill by 1.4% of the vote. If Hill had won the ballot lottery instead of O'Malley, his vote percentage would have been higher and hers would have been lower. Very simple. Same with Jesse Reyes; his margin of victory was small enough that if the first-position advantage had shifted to Boyd or Flannigan, his percentage would have decreased, and his opponent's would have increased, by enough that he would have lost.

The fact that some first-position candidates are defeated doesn’t mean that ballot position is worthless; it merely means that their first-position advantages were trumped by other variables. Pamela Hill-Veal, listed first, was edged out by Mat Delort, who was slated, endorsed by the Tribune, and had top bar ratings. Patrick Sherlock, listed first, ceded other advantages to his two opponents -- gender, bar ratings, Tribune endorsement, slating, even had to share his Irish-name advantage with one opponent -- and so he lost to both of them. Without the first position, he would have lost by a greater margin. To reiterate, all variables must be considered together and not simply in isolation.

As far as why the first position draws extra votes, theories have been offered but the question is still unanswered. It's a fascinating question, no doubt about it. But whether or not the underlying mechanism is understood yet, the evidence clearly shows that the first position is an advantage for the candidates who possess it. And as such, it must be accounted for.

One final comment. I’m very grateful for all of the work that Mr. Leyhane does to cast light on judicial elections and for his interest in my research. And I always appreciate people like Mr. Strom who take enough of an interest in the subject to look for potential problems with my work. Public review and critical evaluation is what makes research better in the long run. But claiming that I "hate" the votes cast by some voters, and implying that I have some sort of anti-democracy desire to see certain people not vote at all... that’s going a little overboard, to put it kindly. My respect for the electorate is part of the reason that I dedicated myself to the judicial-selection topic in the first place; otherwise it isn’t the issue at all and it shouldn’t have been questioned. Let’s keep things civil and stick to the matters at hand.

Now, on to retention season!

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* Klumpp, "Judicial primary elections in Cook County, Illinois: fear the Irish women!" DePaul Law Review 60:3 (Spring 2011), pp. 821-847.

Friday, April 20, 2012

Nine new Associate Judges named today

The Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts has released the names of the nine men and women elected by the Cook County Circuit Court judges to serve as Associate Judges.

All three current Circuit Court judges on the short list were chosen, namely Mary S. Trew, Stanley L. Hill, and Nicholas Geanopolous. These judges had been serving pursuant to Supreme Court appointment but were unsuccessful in their recent primary election bids.

The other six new Associate Judges include Assistant State's Attorney Joseph M. Cataldo, Assistant Public Defender Lana C. Johnson, and Assistant Attorney General Richard D. Schwind. (Schwind had been a finalist for Associate Judge in 2009.)

Greene and Letts partner Allen P. Walker was chosen, as were solo practitioners Steven Mark Wagner and Michael J. Kane.

The concept of speed limits does not lend itself to enforcement by camera

Fran Spielman writes that the city plans to "go slow" on speed cameras in an article posted on the Chicago Sun-Times website. She quotes Transportation Commissioner Gabe Klein as saying, "We may do some pilots earlier in the fall, but I don't think you’ll actually see cameras out there on the streets issuing ticketing for bad behavior until the end of the year at the earliest."

It doesn't matter, in my opinion: Any is too many.

I know, I know, these cameras are supposed to make our streets safer for pedestrians, and children especially. The City resolutely insists that these cameras are about safety, not revenue. I don't buy it.

I'm willing to revise my opinion, of course -- just as soon as a speed camera leaps down from its pole (or jumps up from the pavement -- speed cameras can be put there, too) and snatches a child to safety from the path of a speeding car.

But I respectfully submit that there is is a more fundamental objection to the entire concept of speed cameras.

Back in 2009 (when speed cameras were rejected by the legislature), I contended that determining who is a speeder is fundamentally different from determining whether someone has, or has not, blown a red light.
Running a red light is an either/or proposition. An unthinking, unblinking camera can reasonably make that call. But can it really decide when someone is really "speeding"?
"Speed limits," at least as commonly understood, are not really "limits" at all. A limit is an absolute: Try buying three items when the store says "limit two." Watch what happens when you exceed your credit limit. A "speed limit," on the other hand, is more like a target or an average. At rush hour on most Chicago arterial streets, achieving the posted "speed limit" is an impossible goal; at non-peak hours, though, on those same streets, a speed limit may be more of a posted minimum. The one thing "speed limits" are not -- generally -- are scientifically demonstrable maximums beyond which no vehicle may safely travel.

Even the new City ordinance recognizes that "speed limits" are more flexible than "limits" used in other contexts: That's why fines don't kick in (for now, anyway) until a car is observed going six miles per hour above the posted limit. But one-size-fits-all discretion is a poor substitute for the real thing.

A police officer observing traffic may see that traffic is moving safely and smoothly at 37... 38... maybe even 39... 40 mph... and choose not to enforce a 30 mph limit. A police officer observing traffic on that same street on an icy Winter's day may see that it is unsafe to drive at even 20 mph -- and pull over a motorist who tries. A driver can be ticketed under §11-601(a) of the Motor Vehicle Code for "driving too fast for conditions." ("The fact that the speed of a vehicle does not exceed the applicable maximum speed limit does not relieve the driver from the duty to decrease speed... when special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions.")

A police officer has training, judgment and discretion. The most advanced unthinking, unblinking eye has none of these. Programming is not discretion.

Nor, thank you, are the "three levels of review" (promised by Commissioner Klein) any substitute for the discretion of a police officer on the scene. According to the linked Sun-Times article, Klein says that any picture obtained by a speed camera would be subject to review by its operator; "by IBM, which has a contract with the city’s Department of Revenue and Finance and by the city’s Department of Transportation," all before a ticket is issued.

Cynics will claim that this merely creates multiple opportunities for the city to weed out potential tickets against cars registered to Politician A, while allowing tickets to be spit out for Non-Clouted Citizens B through Z, all of whom were "keeping up with traffic."

When a police officer pulls over a 'pace car' it has a remarkable effect on the traffic that had been "keeping up": It slows down. Even if the stopped driver gets a "pass" from the officer (whether because of clout, a fetching smile, or a plausible sob story), the purpose of slowing traffic -- the safety purpose -- has been achieved. But when the flash goes off 20 times and only 19 tickets are issued? I would expect that City will want to be particularly vigilant against this possible abuse -- but I don't know how the City can ever hope to protect itself against this possibility.

And there's one thing more. While a police officer can issue a ticket as well as any camera, he or she would not have to be a mute, impotent witness to a child being run down: A police officer could pull a child to safety from the path of a speeding car.

I suppose nothing can deter the City of Chicago from proceeding with the installation of cameras. But I have to admit to just a hint of amusement at a suggestion made by Edward McClelland on the NBC5 Ward Room blog. He suggests:
[I]ndex parking, speeding and red-light camera tickets to income. If you earn less than $20,000 a year, you pay $20. If you earn between $20,000 and $50,000, you pay $40. If you earn between $50,000 and $100,000 a year, you pay $80. And if, like an alderman, you earn more than $100,000 a year, you pay $200. That will ensure the fines hit everyone equally hard. Since the tickets are supposed to a deterrent to speeding, we have to make sure the wealthy feel it just as much as the indigent.

It’ll be like a graduated income tax. All 50 members of the City Council are Democrats, and if there's one thing Democrats believe, it's that the rich should pay more than the poor. So I’m sure they’ll embrace this idea.
Because, remember, it's all about safety, not revenue, right?

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Also related: Getting a clearer picture of speed cameras and other surveillance devices