Now I know some FWIW readers will instantly bristle about 'MAGAites' or 'TRUMPpets' coming into our courts to disturb our peace and quiet, and the lawyers filing suit on Judge Brown's behalf are indeed from Texas, as you will see if you follow the links below... however, the Liberty Justice Center website today is crowing over the Supreme Court's decision yesterday tossing out the Trump tarriffs. The real world is often more complicated than our slogans acknowledge, no matter how loud we chant them.
After the press release, I want to offer a few thoughts. But, first, the press release:
The Liberty Justice Center filed a federal civil rights lawsuit on behalf of Judge James R. Brown, a retired Cook County judge who was removed from his judicial recall appointment after Illinois Supreme Court justices retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment rights as a private citizen. Judge Brown—who served honorably as a Cook County Circuit Court judge for 18 years—was urgently recalled to the bench by the Illinois Supreme Court in December 2025 to help fill judicial vacancies. Just six weeks later, he was abruptly removed from the bench without notice, without a hearing and without due process.Readers will notice reference to an "unsigned statement" in the press release, one issued by the Supreme Court at the time Judge Brown's recall order was terminated. That statement was also referred to in Melissa Dai's January 26 article on Injustice Watch announcing Brown's removal.
Judge Brown was removed after the Cook County Bar Association and the Chicago Council of Lawyers objected to an opinion column and podcast appearance he made months earlier while retired and as a private citizen. Despite acknowledging his decades-long record of impartial service, bar groups demanded his removal based solely on this protected speech. The Illinois Supreme Court subsequently vacated Judge Brown’s appointment and later issued an unsigned statement admitting that his speech was the motivation for his removal. The justices did so without following constitutionally required procedures.
The Illinois Constitution strictly limits how sitting judges may be removed—only through impeachment or after notice and a public hearing by the Illinois Courts Commission. Judge Brown received neither. Instead, the justices acted unilaterally, exceeding their constitutional authority in violation of Judge Brown’s First Amendment rights and his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process. The Liberty Justice Center’s lawsuit challenges both the violation of Judge Brown’s individual rights and the unconstitutional application of the Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct to retired judges, whose speech as private citizens cannot lawfully be restricted.
“By removing Judge James Brown from the bench, the justices of the Illinois Supreme Court chose politics over the rule of law,” said Brendan Philbin, Senior Counsel at the Liberty Justice Center. “In a frantic rush to obey the partisan directives of the Cook County Bar Association and Chicago Council of Lawyers, the justices ignored the Illinois Constitution and trampled on the First Amendment rights of Judge Brown. Considering Judge Brown’s long career of judicial service, he deserves better.”
“I’m grateful to the Liberty Justice Center for representing me in my pursuit of justice and defending my constitutional rights of free speech. I did not receive any due process and I look forward to having my position on the bench restored,” said Judge James R. Brown.
The Liberty Justice Center’s lawsuit seeks to restore Judge Brown to his recall position for the remainder of his term, to secure declaratory relief recognizing that the justices’ actions violated the U.S. Constitution and to obtain damages for the economic and reputational harm Judge Brown has suffered.
Brown v. Neville, et al. was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois [26 C 1925]. The complaint in Brown v. Neville, et al. is available here.
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There was no statement put up on the Supreme Court's website when Brown's recall appointment was terminated. I looked. Looking to do my own follow-up story, I reached out to the Supreme Court and to Injustice Watch in hopes of obtaining it. Injustice Watch obliged. Here is the statement:
January 26, 2026The Supreme Court's Communications Director told me in an email that this statement was "no longer valid" because "the composition of the Court has changed." This refers, presumably, to the resignation of Justice Theis and the installation of Justice Tailor. Justice Theis left the Court on January 29; Justice Tailor joined on January 30.
STATEMENT ON VACATED ASSIGNMENT ORDER
The Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct “establishes standards for the ethical conduct of judges” and it applies to all judges. The Court became aware of public statements that Judge Brown made during his retirement that were not disclosed during the application process. Judge Brown’s public statements, once he was sitting as an active judge, clearly violate Rule 1.2. Further, under Rule 2.11(A)(4), Judge Brown’s impartiality as a judge might reasonably be questioned, due to the nature of his public comments.
I am no insider -- obviously -- but I can just see the Court's 'statement' as something that was created in anticipation of press inquiries, perhaps even in direct response to Ms. Dai or someone else at Injustice Watch. I believe the Court would have better served if it had refused to respond, or referred to the termination order without further comment. That way, the press would have been left to speculate on whether the Court had acceded to demands for Brown's removal from the Chicago Council of Lawyers. (The Cook County Bar Association merely 'strongly opposed' Brown's recall.) The unsigned statement may not remove all doubt about whether the Supreme Court bowed to this pressure, but it removes a lot of it.
There is likewise no doubt that neither Judge Brown, nor any other Illinois judge, while sitting as a judge, could say what then-retired Judge Brown did in his article for John Kass. If a different sitting judge had published positions equally and oppositely opposed to those expressed by Judge Brown (Ret.) in his guest column, that sitting judge would likewise be guilty of violations of the 2023 Code of Judicial Conduct. In this sense, the Supreme Court's unfortunate 'statement' is correct: The statements would violate the Code if made "once he was sitting as an active judge."
The point, however, is that Judge Brown was not "sitting as an active judge" when he did the Kass column or appeared on the Kass podcast.
On the other hand, the Code can apply to persons who are not sitting judges. It applies also, at least in some circumstances, to "judicial candidates." Was Judge Brown a "judicial candidate" when he wrote the Kass article or appeared on the podcast?
The Code of Judicial Conduct defines a "judicial candidate" as "any person, including a sitting judge, who is seeking selection for or retention in judicial office by election or appointment. A person becomes a candidate for judicial office as soon as such person makes a public announcement of candidacy; declares or files as a candidate with the election or appointment authority; authorizes or, where permitted, engages in solicitation or acceptance of contributions or support; or is nominated for election or appointment to office. See Rules 4.1, 4.3, and 4.4."
Brown retired in 2020. The Kass article appeared on September 5, 2025. The podcast dropped (I think that's the right word) on September 29, 2025. Brown was recalled to the bench on December 11.
According to his Complaint (¶26), "On September 22, 2025, Judge Brown received an email from the Illinois Judges Association calling for retired Illinois Circuit Court and Appellate Court judges to apply for temporary recall appointments to fill twelve judicial vacancies in the Circuit Court of Cook County." In order to apply (¶28), "retired judges were directed to submit a statement of interest and a resume of the applicant’s judicial experience by October 13." Brown says he applied on October 3 (¶33). He included a copy of the email he sent to the Court expressing his interest in a recall appointment as Exhibit 4 to his Complaint (pp. 38-41).
If, as his Complaint alleges, Brown 'declared or filed' his request for appointment with the Court on October 3, he was not a judicial candidate on September 5 or September 29 and the Code of Judicial Conduct does not apply.
The Supreme Court's statement says it "became aware of public statements that Judge Brown made during his retirement that were not disclosed during the application process."
When I applied for associate judge, and when I applied for appointments to vacancies, and when I sought ratings from the bar associations, I had to disclose things I had written, or things that had been written about me. These were asked for. Clearly, however, here, the Court did not ask recall applicants to make similar disclosures.
Now I would guess that the reason why the bar groups and the various judicial screening committees want judicial hopefuls to make self-disclosures of publications or media mentions is because it saves them a lot of time looking things up. I know that bar groups do sometimes look things up independently -- despite the self-disclosure requirement -- because, from time to time, a candidate is called out for failing to disclose something that was expressly asked for. I don't know whether judicial screening committees also conduct independent investigations.
But I do know that the Illinois Supreme Court is privileged to do as much investigation as it wants, or as little, in making appointments. There was a time, still within living memory for some of us, when the only investigation necessary was a call to (or more likely from) the Fifth Floor. In later years, there was a member of the Court reputed to rely solely, or primarily, on the advice of, for example, Ed Vrdolyak. In the case of these recent recall assignments, it appears that the Court chose not to to do a whole lot of independent investigation. As the Court is privileged to do.
Brown's Complaint alleges (¶34) that, "Judge Brown had no interview and no further communication with the Illinois Supreme Court until he was informed by email that he had been selected as a recall judicial appointment." After his recall was terminated, I had the opportunity to speak with Judge Brown. He told me that he had more or less expected at least a phone call from someone, if not an actual interview, but none was requested.
So Brown did not tell the Court about the Kass column. But neither did the Court ask. However, it's not as if Judge Brown (then retired) whispered forbidden opinions in dark alleys with co-conspirators, only to be overheard by a public-spirited member of a bar group. Kass may not have as many readers now as he did when he was appearing in the Tribune, but I'm sure his numbers are far, far better than mine. I'd like to say that the Supreme Court 'knew or should have known' about Brown's September column, but I'm afraid this is just another example of our increasingly fragmented society: We only know things these days that happen or are talked about in our own 'silos' or 'echo chambers.'
The gist of Brown's three-count Complaint is that, once he was put back on the bench, he could only be removed by the procedures specified by the Illinois Constitution: impeachment or removal by the Illinois Courts Commission. I don't know how that argument will fare in the District Court. But the 'unsigned statement' does support the idea that he was removed as a matter of judicial discipline, i.e., for violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct -- and that may help his cause.
Although I have seen it done elsewhere (see, e.g., "Pro-Trump Cook County judge booted from court sues to get job back," by Jonathan Bilyk), I submit that it is both unfair and shallow to frame the Brown case in merely partisan terms.
Here's the way I look at it: James Brown wrote some things, when neither a judge nor a judicial candidate, that he would not have been permitted to write (or at least he would have to have written them quite differently) if he were a sitting judge. That these opinions expressed by Judge Brown are "pro-Trump" is really of no moment. What is important is that the Supreme Court put him on the bench, notwithstanding these statements, or in ignorance of these statements. It doesn't matter which. They put him back on the bench, then removed him because a couple of bar groups took umbrage with things he said in retirement. This undermines judicial independence. And not just Judge Brown's independence -- the Supreme Court's as well.
On the subject of judicial independence, the ISBA website says, "An independent judiciary is fundamental to the rule of law, the separation of powers in our constitutional democracy, and the impartial administration of justice." The preamble of the Code of Judicial Conduct says, "An independent, fair, and impartial judiciary is indispensable to our system of justice." No judge can ever hope to be "independent" if he or she must at all times, in all places, and in all things, conform to the prevailing political winds.
The two bar groups that led the charge against Judge Brown, the Cook County Bar Association and the Chicago Council of Lawyers, had previously rated Brown Qualified, most recently in 2014 when he sought retention. Indeed, every bar group that belonged to the Alliance in 2014 (there have been some additions since) found Brown Qualified in 2014:
None of the bar groups were asked to do a new evaluation of recall candidates before they were appointed in 2025, nor did they. The CCBA and CCL letters do not reference any actual complaints of litigants or court personnel after Brown returned to the bench -- and for good reason: The CCBA's letter is dated December 29, a mere 18 days after the effective date of Brown's recall. The Council's letter followed on January 5.
Now, if you have stayed with me this far, you may be ready to burst: No one, you may say, could possibly be a fair and impartial judge if he holds these opinions. These are certainly political opinions, shared to greater or lesser degrees by millions of Americans, and even by some members of your family (don't bother to deny it -- I see all the stuff online about how to get through holiday dinners without discord). Do you mean to say that one must hold specific opinions in order to be a judge? Which ones?
The problem here is that fashionable political opinions come in and out of fashion. For example, you don't have to go far on the Internet to find video of a younger Bernie Sanders demanding tougher immigration enforcement because keeping out cheap foreign labor forces greedy businesses to pay (however reluctantly) higher wages to American workers. Pick any issue you want; opinions have evolved on it. Judge Brown got elected from Cook County's 14th Subcircuit -- unopposed -- as were all 14th Subcircuit candidates in those days -- and, obviously, as a Democrat. There weren't any Republicans there, at least none to speak of. So: You want only judges who conform to the party platform today. When it changes tomorrow, will we throw all the judges out who weren't selected under the new standard? How is that consistent with our bedrock principle of judicial independence?
I completely accept the right of political parties to slate candidates, even for judicial office, based, at least in part, on their fealty to particular political positions. Because that is the function of political parties. But, at the same time, I reject the notion that bar groups should police the political attitudes of prospective, current, or potentially recalled judges. This undermines their ability to fairly evaluate judicial candidates, or at least it undermines the public's perception that the bar groups are conducting fair, nonpartisan evaluations. Let the committeepersons sort out the candidate's political bona fides; the bar groups should be focused on whether the candidate knows the law, follows the law, comports him- or herself professionally in court, and treats co-counsel and clients and other litigants and court staff with due respect.
Sadly, in the case of Judge Brown, we have a Supreme Court that has undermined its own independence by letting bar association objections about a judge's political opinions, expressed at a time and in a manner when he was at complete liberty to do so, prod it into terminating a recall appointment, which it may or may not have been able to do. The bar groups have damaged their legitimacy by insisting that legitimate political opinions (however unpopular they may be in these parts) automatically disqualify a person from further judicial service, despite an unblemished 18-year judicial career in which the fairness and impartiality of the judge in question was never an issue. And it's not as if this judge was being assigned to heater criminal cases, or heart-rending cases in chancery. No, this guy was supposed to work a spot in Traffic Court until the next class of judges is elected and one of the rookies can be assigned to take his place. I would make a joke here about how this case should have been handled in the Court of Common Sense... but then I'd get everybody mad at me....
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