Three candidates removed from Supreme Court race in Second Judicial District

The news has been reported elsewhere: Last week the Illinois State Board of Elections removed three candidates, two Republicans and one Democrat, from the race for the Thomas vacancy in the newly reconstituted Second Judicial District.

Appellate Court Justice Susan F. Hutchinson and former Lake County Sheriff (and one-time U.S. Senate candidate) Mark C. Curran, Jr. were the two Republicans knocked off the ballot; Highland Park Mayor (and a former Attorney General candidate) Nancy Rodkin Rotering was the Democratic candidate dropped.

There are a number of takeaways from this decision of the Illinois State Board of Elections, however, and we'll work through these here.

To begin with, the State Board of Elections rejected the recommendation of its hearing officer, who would have allowed all three to remain on the ballot. So -- first takeaway -- an elections board, like most administrative agencies in Illinois, is not bound to adhere to a hearing officer's recommendations. Elections boards typically do follow the recommendations made by their hearing officers (a board would not be likely to appoint hearing officers whose judgment and abilities were, in the board's view, suspect) but they need not.

In this case, the State Board of Elections also expressly rejected the recommendation of its own General Counsel.

The 2022 Candidate's Guide, published by the Illinois State Board of Elections, indicated that 334 valid petition signatures would be required in order to qualify for the ballot as either a Democrat or Republican in the race for the Second Judicial District vacancy (pp. 32-33). The Guide explained that the signature requirement was based on "[a]t least 0.4% (.004) of the number of votes cast in that district for the candidate for their political party for the office of Governor at the last General Election at which a Governor was elected, but in no event less than 500 signatures. For 2022 only, these signature requirements shall be reduced by one-third. (10 ILCS 5/2A-1.1b(b), 7-10(h)). The Guide did not expressly state that, since the Second Judicial District did not exist in its present configuration at "the Last General Election at which a Governor was elected" [2018], the 500 signature minimum provision would apply -- but even mathematically-challenged lawyers know how to divide by three and could therefore easily see the derivation of the 334 signature requirement.

But everything depends on the meaning of the word "district."

The word "district" is defined at §1-3(14) of the Elections Code (10 ILCS 5/1-3(14)) to mean "any area which votes as a unit for the election of any officer, other than the State or a unit of local government or school district, and includes, but is not limited to, legislative, congressional and judicial districts, judicial circuits, county board districts, municipal and sanitary district wards, school board districts, and precincts."

The newly constituted Second Judicial District has not yet 'voted as a unit.'

The word "district" is at least arguably used in two different ways in §7-10(h) of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/7-10(h)):

(h) Judicial office. Except as otherwise provided in this Code, if a candidate seeks to run for judicial office in a district, then the candidate's petition for nomination must contain the number of signatures equal to 0.4% of the number of votes cast in that district for the candidate for his or her political party for the office of Governor at the last general election at which a Governor was elected, but in no event less than 500 signatures. If a candidate seeks to run for judicial office in a circuit or subcircuit, then the candidate's petition for nomination must contain the number of signatures equal to 0.25% of the number of votes cast for the judicial candidate of his or her political party who received the highest number of votes at the last general election at which a judicial officer from the same circuit or subcircuit was regularly scheduled to be elected, but in no event less than 1,000 signatures in circuits and subcircuits located in the First Judicial District or 500 signatures in every other Judicial District.

Here, "district" could mean that handful of counties that now constitute the Second Judicial District -- the first usage of the word is consistent with this -- or it could mean an area that votes as a unit, and has heretofore voted as a district, as is at least arguably suggested by this phrase -- "equal to 0.4% of the number of votes cast in that district for the candidate for his or her political party for the office of Governor at the last general election at which a Governor was elected."

The objectors to Hutchinson, Curran, and Rotering and, ultimately the State Board of Elections, saw no ambiguity: The .4% calculation could be easily made for the Democratic and Republican candidates in each of the counties that now constitute the Second Judicial District. The State Constitution requires judicial districts to be made up of whole counties, and county boundaries haven't changed in this State in many years. Therefore, the .4% of the number of votes can be easily calculated -- and, as the Board found, when reduced by one-third as required for this election only, the actual required number of signatures required for a Democratic candidate was 791 and 757 for a Republican.

I have not heard whether the ISBE's decision to remove Hutchinson, Curran, and Rotering from the primary ballot will be appealed -- but the second takeaway from all this is that, while the ISBE Candidate's Guide is a great starting point for a person thinking about judicial office, the conclusions and calculations that it offers are not necessarily authoritative. As the Preface to the Guide states (in bold type, no less):

Legal information contained in this guide is not binding and should not be construed as legal advice or sufficient argument in response to an objection to any candidate’s nominating papers. The State Board of Elections recommends that all prospective candidates consult with competent legal counsel when preparing their nomination papers.

A third takeaway from all this is that the mapmakers have every hope and expectation of electing a Democrat from the new Second Judicial District: In 2018 Pritzker bested Rauner in the counties now comprising the Second Judicial District -- which is why, when the calculation required by §7-10(h) were performed, Democratic candidates needed more signatures than Republicans in this new district.

And there is still a fourth takeaway to be had here.

A person aspiring to a seat on the State's highest court this year needed fewer than 150 more signatures than a candidate for a Circuit Court judgeship in a Cook County subcircuit (where 667 valid signatures were required).

This perhaps says something about what the political class thinks of judges.

But what do you expect in a state where Chicago alderpersons are elected on an allegedly 'nonpartisan' basis, but wannabe judges must endure party primaries?

It's not like judges are considered important or anything by our political classes -- at least, judges are not nearly as important as commissioners of the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago. MWRD candidates must secure no less than 5,770 signatures in order to qualify for the ballot....

Two Republican candidates remain on the ballot for the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial District. These are Kane County Circuit Court Judge John A. Noverini and Lake County Circuit Court Judge Daniel B. Shanes. Two Democratic candidates also remain. These are Kane County Circuit Court Judge René Cruz and Lake County Circuit Court Judge Elizabeth "Liz" Rochford.